India Watch Briefing #19
Fresh Angles on the EU-India TTC, US-India cooperation in the Indian Ocean, and the IMEC
Editor’s note
In this edition, I have featured a must-read analysis on the EU-India Trade and Technology Council, a piece on US-India relations (special focus on the Indian Ocean), and fresh perspectives on the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). You will also find excellent events from Chatham House and the Körber-Stiftung, along with a great call for papers for young researchers from CIDOB.
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Our main highlights for this edition:
“How to Leverage the EU–India Partnership on Critical and Emerging Technologies?” by Amaia Sánchez Cacicedo for Institut Montaigne
“It is not enough to sign MoUs such as that between the EU 6G Smarts Networks & Service Industry Association and the Indian Bharat 6G Alliance. The institutional intent, even if it stems from the highest level, must be combined with functional bodies that support the operationalization process. Issues of interoperability and standards-setting came up as requiring special attention, particularly in connection with DPI (e.g., the mutual recognition of e-signatures) as well as IT and telecoms. Allowing the private sector to get involved with policy-making from the start may well facilitate this process, particularly taking into account India’s techno-nationalist approach and Europe’s increasing openness in this regard. […] Research, innovation, and the joint development of CETs across key strategic sectors represent one of the most promising avenues for EU-India cooperation. While notable differences exist, the US-India partnership can serve as a valuable reference point for the EU’s own efforts to deepen its strategic ties with India. More importantly, the current momentum must not be overlooked. The confluence of US-China competition, ongoing tensions between the US and Europe, and India’s ambition to integrate into global critical supply chains across the Indo-Pacific create a unique window of opportunity for EU-India strategic engagement to flourish.”
“U.S.-India Maritime Futures: The Upper Limits of Security Burden-sharing in the Indian Ocean” by Nilanthi Samaranayake for Perry World House
“While the history of U.S.-India relations in the Indian Ocean is too broad a subject to survey here, it is worth acknowledging that—for better or worse—there have been times when both countries were on distinctly separate sides regarding U.S. security policies in the region. For example, the United States and India had opposing stances in 1971 over the independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), which resulted in the still-controversial deployment of the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier task force. India supported the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan at the United Nations in 1980. Nearly a decade later, India was so concerned about U.S. naval access to Sri Lanka’s ports and a Voice of Americastation that references to Sri Lanka’s policies regarding port access and “foreign broadcasting organisations” were inserted into a peace accord’s exchange of letters from Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene in 1987. Episodes of U.S.-India divergence on security approaches are not limited to the Cold War era. For example, India was successful in persuading Maldives to reject a military Status of Forces Agreement proposed by the United States in 2013. Since the election of Prime Minister Modi in 2014, however, U.S.-India strategic and defense relations have expanded significantly. While some high-profile differences have emerged such as over U.S. sanctions policies on Russia in previous administrations, the bilateral security relationship has continued to soar and appears to still be growing in the new administration under President Trump.”
“French envoy eager for Europe to strengthen trade with UAE and India” by Sunniva Rose for The National News
“Momentum is increasing across Europe. Until recently, Mr Mestrallet was the only special IMEC envoy, but Italy appointed former diplomatic adviser to Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Francesco Maria Talo, on April 2. Both Italy and Greece are pushing their ports – Trieste and Piraeus – as potential rivals to Marseille. “There is a major opportunity for transport, energy and construction firms to expand their markets,” said Alberto Rizzi, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank. At its heart, IMEC is an Indian initiative – a strategic push to diversify partnerships and lessen reliance on China. “For India, it's an important policy point to talk about international connectivity projects. It [IMEC] would help India increase both its regional and global footprint,” said Garima Mohan, a Brussels-based senior fellow in the German Marshall Fund's Indo-Pacific programme.”
Indian Foreign Policy in Brief
“BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants” by Ashley J. Tellis for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
“Among the initial five members, India has the closest ties with Russia and South Africa because of past bipolar competition and the anti-apartheid struggle, respectively. India’s ties with Brazil are cordial but limited, originally expressed through the G77 group of developing countries now frequently referred to as the “Global South.” India’s ties with China, in contrast, are persistently rivalrous despite the deepening amity between Moscow and Beijing. Both India and Brazil seek to prevent BRICS from sliding into inveterate anti-Westernism as Moscow and Beijing would prefer. Conversely, despite India’s close relationship with South Africa, the latter has strong sympathies for Russia, increasingly close ties with China, and a striking suspicion of the West. Despite these incongruities, India has been a stalwart BRICS member for multiple reasons. First, when the West dominates the high tables globally, BRICS affords India an alternative stage where New Delhi can associate with other emerging powers and display international leadership that satisfies its desires for status and recognition. Second, India views BRICS as a useful instrument for engendering multipolarity wherein India becomes one of several great powers in the global system. Third, BRICS provides another forum for India to claim leadership of the Global South—an old objective given new impetus by the recent membership additions of five new developing countries, with others waiting in the wings. Fourth, BRICS supplies New Delhi with opportunities to demonstrate its strategic autonomy and preference for flexible, issue-based partnerships even as it preserves its valuable relationship with the West. Fifth, India values BRICS for direct materialist reasons, expecting that the group’s emerging financial institutions—the NDB and CRA—will provide new sources of lending to developing countries and “democratize” the global financial architecture.”
“BIMSTEC Summit: Despite Lingering Frictions, Signs of Momentum” – Interview with Constantino Xavier by Ramananda Sengupta from StratNewsGlobal
“Like many regional summits, BIMSTEC is as much about bilateral exchanges in the margins as it is about formal multilateral outcomes,” he said. Despite this, Dr Xavier noted a growing political momentum, with leaders meeting more regularly to shape a collective vision for the Bay of Bengal region. One of the key takeaways from the summit was Prime Minister Modi’s announcement of a BIMSTEC Home Ministers’ mechanism, focused on cross-border security issues such as trafficking and insurgency. “This reflects a growing comfort among member states to discuss sensitive security challenges together”. However, the economic front showed little progress. Talks on a free trade agreement –stalled since 2004– remained stagnant. “It’s a clear signal that the broader regional trade agenda is struggling,” Xavier observed. Interestingly, power dynamics within the bloc appear to be shifting. While smaller nations have historically viewed India’s influence with caution, Xavier suggests a reversal. “Except for Bangladesh, most member states now see India as an anchor for economic and strategic stability—and want more, not less, Indian leadership,” he said. Still, irritants persist. Non-tariff barriers and red tape hamper regional trade. “We’re still stuck in outdated bureaucratic systems where, absurdly, each sock is counted as a separate item,” he pointed out. Despite these quirks, India has made strides in trade facilitation and connectivity. As for tangible outcomes, Xavier highlighted three: greater energy cooperation, deeper regional security dialogue, and a growing push for infrastructure connectivity. While critics question BIMSTEC’s pace, Xavier stressed that summits are just the visible tip of ongoing work. “The real action happens between the summits—in the quiet but crucial sectoral meetings.”
Spotlight on EU-India Relations
“Unpacking Europe: The future of EU-India relations” by Anunita Chandrasekar for Centre for European Reform
After the recent visit of the EU's College of Commissioners to New Delhi, CER's Anunita Chandrasekar speaks to Tara Varma, who is currently a visiting fellow at Brookings Institution's Centre for the US and Europe, and Amaia Sánchez-Cacicedo, senior fellow covering Asia and India at Institut Montaigne, to consider the trajectory of EU-India relations.
“Irrelevant on the Geopolitical Chessboard? Germany and Europe Must Reinvent Themselves in a Hostile World” by Thorsten Benner for Asianet
“In February this year, an Indian investor told me during a conversation, “Germany or EU are irrelevant on the geopolitical chessboard… Hard power, economy, and independent foreign policy matter.” He went on to assert that India is a “great power, ranking above the EU and Germany in this era.” His tone echoed that of U.S. president Donald Trump, who famously dismisses those he considers inferior— “You don’t have the cards.” For Europeans in general and Germans in particular, this is a useful cold shower. […] Germans should increase their curiosity about advances in India and learn from Indian successes, for example, in the field of digital public infrastructure. We should invest more in exchange and dialogue among parliamentarians, researchers, and think tanks. The Robert Bosch Foundation Global Dialogue Program organized by German, Australian, and Indian think tanks to facilitate parliamentary exchange is one example how to go about this. I have been fortunate to be able to co-organize this program and learn from interacting with many Indian counterparts. I look forward to participating in the Carnegie Global Technology Summit in Delhi next week, a valuable forum for exchange and learning. Maybe that Indian investor who thinks Europe is irrelevant on the geopolitical chess board will also be able to follow some of the debates. And maybe he will discover that however embattled, Europe still has a few cards to play.”
“India and the European Union: Old Economic Agenda and the New Global Context” by C. Raja Mohan for ISAS (NUS)
“The focus of Modi and von der Leyen was on deepening trade ties, expanding security cooperation, intensifying technological collaboration, reinforcing mutual efforts for green transition and promoting connectivity between India. The two leaders also agreed to “promote legal, safe and orderly migration in areas of skilled workforce and professionals in view of India’s growing human capital and taking into account [the] EU member states’ demographic profile and labour market needs.” […] The past record of negotiations on free trade does not lend much optimism to the declared attempt to negotiate an agreement before the end of 2025. What has changed though is the larger international context in which the Indian and European economies operate. Given the challenges of mounting trade deficits with China and the unpredictability of Trump’s economic policies, India and Europe no longer have the luxury of neglecting their trade ties. Yet, there is no denying that the trade bureaucracies of the two sides have a reputation for being difficult interlocutors. Success in concluding an India-EU FTA in 2025 will depend on the willingness of Modi and von der Leyen to sustain pressure on their respective bureaucracies to bring the negotiations to an early conclusion. What is at stake is not merely the bilateral trade relationship but the geopolitical standing of India and Europe in the rapidly changing structure of great power relations between the US, Russia and China.”
“Why partnering with India could boost EU tech sovereignty” by Chloe Teevan and Gautam Kamath for EUROPP – European Politics and Policy (LSE)
“Europe has much to learn from India’s experience, although as trade and technology talks with India ramp up, the EU will also be keen to emphasise its own digital regulations that provide a helpful regulatory framework to complement the India Stack. In particular, the EU is keen to emphasise security and trust, and to ensure that similar efforts are aligned with EU regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). At the same time, any discussion of digital public infrastructure will need to take place within a wider conversation about the full stack, given ongoing concerns about everything from semiconductor supply chains to access to computing power. Indeed on 28 February, the EU and India agreed to work together across several parts of the digital stack. This cooperation will include hardware, such as supporting chip design, regulating telecommunications infrastructure and investments in high performance computing. It will also extend to the logical layer (the interoperability of digital public infrastructure) and cooperation between artificial intelligence (AI) offices in supporting the development of “ethical and responsible AI”. Yet, making this relationship more concrete will now require wider conversations, bringing in not only EU and Indian officials but also a wider cross section of academics, industry representatives and think tanks. Only a wider exchange between actors can spur a new and meaningful tech partnership and support the aims of both the EU and India with regard to building tech sovereignty.”
“Convergence Among Divergences: The India-NATO Diplomatic Odyssey” from the NATO-India Youth Conference
This panel delved into the evolving diplomatic engagement between India and NATO, examining how both entities –despite diverse geostrategic orientations– can collaborate on a common vision of stability, security, and multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond the military and defence prism, speakers explored opportunities for engagement in areas such as cyber resilience, maritime security, climate change, and emerging technologies. Speakers: Martine Aamdal Bottheim, Georg Enzweiler, Vivek Mishra and Elena Lazarou. Moderator: Swasti Rao.
Spotlight on “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai”
“The Bhutan Anomaly: "Friendly Annexation" in China’s Border Politics” by Robert Barnett for SOAS China Institute
“China’s border policy with Bhutan thus presents what might be called the Bhutan anomaly, a form of acute cognitive dissonance in diplomatic discourse where speech and practice are in open, explicit contradiction. In this situation, a negotiating party plays both ends of a strategy: it does both what it says it should do and what it says it would never do, while denying any conflict between the two. China and Bhutan thus continue to treat each other as friendly neighbours and to hold negotiations as prescribed by China’s Five Principles, its Law on Foreign Relations, and Xi’s Global Security Initiative. At the same time, China has already decided the practical outcome of those talks through military intervention and relocation of the population in the relevant areas. Meanwhile, Bhutan, making the best of an impossible situation, after several years of silence on the issue, now says there are “no Chinese settlements” in its territory. This suggests that Bhutan has finally given up any claim to the areas where China has built the new villages, although numerous official Bhutanese maps, as well as earlier governmental statements and historical records, show those areas as within Bhutan; until the 1990s, even official Chinese maps showed all of the Beyul and its nearby areas as within Bhutan. And so far, apart from a little-noticed report by the US military, no foreign government or foreign politician has even referred to China’s annexations in Bhutan, let alone raised any concerns about them. Neither has any explanation yet come from Chinese scholars for Beijing’s decision to resort to pre-emptive annexation in its dealings with a friendly government. But for China’s smaller neighbours, the Bhutan anomaly will surely figure prominently in their calculations regarding any future border disputes with China.”
Upcoming Events on India's Foreign Policy and Governance (& Opportunities)
“70 Years since Bandung: Non-Alignment, Multi-Alignment, and the Role of Middle Powers”: Tomorrow Körber-Stiftung is going to livestream the launch of the Emerging Middle Powers Report 2025 and a panel debate on a timely question: “Where do we stand, 70 years after Bandung?”. Full info here.
“Why the China-India Relationship Matters for the Future of the Global Order”: Hosted by Chatham House on May 8th (2 PM CET), this panel explores the long-term geopolitical significance of China-India ties and how the West should respond. The discussion is based on a paper that analyzes the relationship from both Chinese and Indian perspectives. It will tackle key questions around bilateral flashpoints, geo-economic competition, and global governance. Full info here.
“Call for papers by young researchers: CIDOB International Yearbook 2026”: With the aim of identifying young researchers and giving them a voice, CIDOB is launching its 6th Call for Papers on the Analysis of International Relations, which is directed at students, experts and analysts under the age of 30 in order to encourage a renewed vision of today’s international challenges. Thematic categories: the transformation of the global economic order, the geopolitics of climate change, and the future of war, Deadline: May 10th, 2025. Full info here.
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